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Introduction
Meeting the goal enshrined in the Paris Agreement of limiting global temper-
ature increases to less than 2°C above pre- industrial levels demands rapid reduc-
tions in global carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. For example, the International 
Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that to provide a high likelihood (66 per cent 
probability) of meeting that target, cumulative global CO2 emissions between 
2015 and 2100 must be less than 880 Giga- tonnes (Gt) (IEA, 2017). For the 
energy sector alone, the IEA estimate a smaller ‘carbon budget’ of 790 Gt. To 
put this in perspective, global energy sector emissions stood at 32.5 Gt in 2017 – 
an increase of 1.4 per cent on the previous year and equivalent to ~4 per cent of 
the remaining budget (IEA, 2018). If emissions continue at this level, the 
budget will be exhausted in less than 25 years. Hence, to achieve the 2°C target, 
energy- related carbon emissions must fall very rapidly. The IEA estimate that 
emissions must fall by ~70 per cent by 20501 – implying a near complete decar-
bonisation of the electricity sector, retrofitting of the entire existing building 
stock, a major shift towards low- emission vehicles and an 80 per cent reduction 
in the carbon intensity of industrial sectors (IEA, 2017). By the end of the 
century, any residual anthropogenic CO2 emissions would need to be balanced 
by CO2 removals from the atmosphere.
 There is no historical precedent for transforming energy systems at this scale 
and at this speed. Achieving this goal will require the rapid and extensive 
deployment of low- carbon technologies throughout all sectors of the global 
economy, with far- reaching implications for markets, infrastructures, institu-
tions, social practices and cultural norms. What is more, emission reduction 
efforts will simultaneously have to address other concerns, including questions 
of social justice, energy access and energy security.
 There is certainly some degree of political ambition to revolutionise the 
energy landscape. The 2016 Paris Agreement provides a strong basis for global 
mitigation efforts and these in turn have encouraged (and have been facilitated 
by) major improvements and cost reductions in renewable energy, electric 
vehicles, energy storage and other low- carbon technologies (UNFCC, 2015). 
Electricity from wind and solar is projected to be cheaper than fossil fuels by the 
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mid- 2020s, and global trends show a rapid uptake of these and other low- carbon 
technologies (Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 2018; IEA, 2017). Modern 
renewables now provide 10 per cent of global final energy demand and more 
than a quarter of global electricity generation, with a record 157 gigawatts 
(GW) being commissioned in 2017 (Frankfurt School–UNEP Centre/BNEF, 
2018).
 Yet despite these encouraging trends the rate of progress remains too slow, 
particularly in relation to improving energy efficiency and reducing energy 
demand. Global primary energy intensity (the ratio of primary energy consump-
tion to GDP) fell by 1.2 per cent in 2017, but this is less than half the rate 
required to meet the 2°C target (IEA, 2017). While a business as usual scenario 
suggests a ~40 per cent increase in global primary energy demand by 2050, a 
2°C scenario suggests practically no increase – unless negative emission tech-
nologies are deployed (IEA, 2017). There are a growing number of policy initi-
atives targeting energy demand, but many of these focus upon incremental 
technological improvements (e.g. insulation) and necessitate only modest 
changes in energy- related behaviour. But to meet the emission reduction targets, 
we must achieve radical changes in energy demand throughout all sectors of the 
global economy. Since only limited increases in global energy demand appear 
compatible with ambitious climate targets (Loftus et al., 2015), developing 
countries must follow very different development paths than have been 
observed historically – leapfrogging to highly energy- efficient technologies and 
providing high levels of human welfare with much lower energy consumption 
that has been required in the past (Steckel et al., 2013). And to allow space for 
increased energy demand in the developing world, there will need to be abso-
lute reductions in energy demand in the developed world. Few countries have 
achieved this in the past, and it is likely to prove very challenging.
Reducing energy demand
The IEA estimates that improved energy efficiency and reduced energy demand 
could contribute up to half of the reductions in global carbon emissions over the 
next few decades (IEA, 2012a; IEA, 2015). In other words, changes in energy 
demand could contribute as much carbon abatement as all the low- carbon 
energy supply options combined. Similarly, the United Kingdom (UK) govern-
ment has recognised that reducing energy demand can be a highly cost- effective 
approach to reaching climate targets, and positions both energy demand reduc-
tion and increased energy efficiency as core policy goals (DTI, 2003, 2007; 
DECC, 2011). But questions remain on how best to achieve these goals.
 The demand for energy is driven by the demand for energy services, such as 
thermal comfort, illumination and mobility. Energy services form the last stage 
of an energy chain that begins with primary energy sources such as crude oil and 
nuclear power, continues through secondary energy carriers such as gasoline and 
electricity and then through end- use conversion devices such as boilers, fur-
naces, motors and lightbulbs. These conversion devices provide ‘useful energy’ 
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such as low- and high- temperature heat, mechanical power and electromagnetic 
radiation, which in turn is preserved or trapped within ‘passive systems’ for a 
period of time to produce final energy services (Cullen and Allwood, 2010). So, 
for example, the heat delivered from a boiler (conversion device) is held within 
a building (passive system) for a period of time to provide thermal comfort 
(energy service).
 It follows that there are three ways to reduce energy demand:
1 Improve conversion efficiencies and reduce transmission losses at all stages 
of the energy chain, including from primary to final energy (e.g. more effi-
cient power stations) and from final to useful energy (e.g. more efficient 
boilers, engines and refrigerators).
2 Improve the ability of passive systems to trap energy for periods of time (e.g. 
more aerodynamic vehicles, better insulated buildings).
3 Reduce demand for energy services, such as heating, lighting and cooling, 
(e.g. lower internal temperatures, fewer overseas flights).
These changes can be achieved through a combination of retrofitting existing 
technologies (e.g. insulating a house), investing in new technologies (e.g. 
installing a condensing boiler) and changing energy- related behaviour (e.g. 
turning off lights when not in use). The latter in turn may involve either 
restraint (e.g. turning the thermostat down, giving up flying) or substitution by 
less energy- intensive services (e.g. shifting from cars to buses). Large improve-
ments in energy efficiency are often associated with simultaneous shifts towards 
different energy carriers – such as replacing gas boilers with (more efficient) 
electric heat pumps or replacing gasoline cars with (more efficient) battery–
electric vehicles. But much of the potential for reducing energy demand requires 
inter- linked changes in all of these areas. More fundamentally, radical reduc-
tions in energy demand are likely to require transitions to entirely new systems 
for providing energy services – such as intermodal transport, compact cities, and 
smart homes.
 None of these options are straightforward and the complexity of the pro-
cesses involved can easily be underestimated. Sorrell (2015) notes, for instance, 
that previous attempts to reduce energy demand have often proved unsuccess-
ful; the assumptions on which policy interventions are based do not always 
reflect either the challenge involved or the factors shaping individual and 
organisational decision- making; and the complexity of economic systems can 
undermine the success of even well- designed interventions. There are numerous 
stumbling blocks on the road to energy demand reductions:
•	 Reducing energy demand is complex: Historically, economic growth has 
been closely linked to increased energy consumption, and few countries 
have achieved ‘absolute decoupling’ of primary energy consumption from 
gross domestic product (GDP) (see Chapter 8). The expectation that 
improved energy efficiency will lead to proportional reductions in energy 
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demand can be misleading (Sorrell, 2009). The links between efficiency 
and demand are complex and rebound effects – in which consumers 
increase their consumption of energy services to take advantage of the fact 
that these services are now cheaper – can partly offset and sometimes com-
pletely eliminate the associated energy savings. In this regard, projections 
of the impact of policy instruments on energy demand often rely upon over-
simplified assumptions (Wilhite et al., 2000; Sorrell, 2015).
•	 Large- scale, rapid change is required: Previous energy transitions (e.g. 
from localised wood use to centralised fossil fuels) have generally been long 
and arduous affairs (Smil, 2010). There may be some hope here, as past 
transitions have generally not been the result of deliberate government 
intervention (Geels et al., 2017). Yet the urgency of the climate change 
agenda means that we require larger, faster and more pervasive changes 
than have been achieved before, supported by policy efforts that have not 
existed in previous energy transitions (Sovacool, 2016). Such efforts will 
require substantial and sustained political commitment, combined with 
global cooperation in the face of powerful incentives to defect and free ride.
•	 Energy demand is rising: Even if the most optimistic forecasts for the 
upscaling of low- carbon energy supply are exceeded, increases in energy 
consumption will blunt their impact. Decarbonisation of energy supply 
must be combined with a break with the historically observed relationship 
between energy consumption and economic growth. If the rate of decar-
bonising energy supply is less than anticipated by the more optimistic scen-
arios, climate targets will only be achieved through greater efforts to reduce 
energy demand or the deployment of negative emission technologies. Given 
the uncertainties associated with the latter (Anderson and Peters, 2016), 
reducing energy demand must be a priority.
•	 Societies are disinclined to change: Energy demand is shaped by large- scale, 
capital- intensive and long- lived technologies and infrastructures (e.g. trans-
port systems, buildings) that constrain the feasible rate of change. This inertia 
is reinforced by the entrenched habits and social practices that develop along-
side these technologies and infrastructures, together with powerful political 
interests that resist change (Rosenbloom and Meadowcroft, 2014). For 
example, policies aimed at reducing automobile dependence face a backlash 
from motorists whose work and leisure patterns are built around the private 
car, and from motor and fossil fuel industries whose economic interests are 
threatened (Dudley and Chatterjee, 2011). For this reason, energy- and 
carbon- intensive forms of energy service provision continues to dominate and 
will be difficult to dislodge.
•	 Carbon pricing is insufficient: Carbon pricing can encourage reductions 
in energy demand and carbon emissions but is unlikely to be sufficient by 
itself. Carbon prices remain much lower than required to meet ambitious 
climate targets and attempts to raise them must overcome formidable 
political obstacles (Loftus et al., 2015). Carbon pricing can encourage 
organisations and individuals to pursue energy efficiency, but many are 
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locked in to energy- inefficient systems and practices, with the costs of 
switching to more efficient systems frequently offsetting the financial 
benefits of lower energy consumption (see Gillingham et al., 2012). 
Moreover, the economic theories underpinning carbon pricing provide a 
poor guide to real- world individual and organisational behaviour (Brown, 
2001; Wilson and Dowlatabadi, 2007).
•	 Current policies neglect innovation: Energy demand reduction requires 
rising energy/carbon prices alongside policies to reduce the economic 
barriers to improved energy efficiency (Sorrell et al., 2004). It requires inter-
ventions that encourage individuals and households to adopt existing 
energy- efficient technologies and practices, alongside support for new 
energy- efficient technologies throughout all stages of the innovation chain. 
But many policy measures are underrepresented in the current policy mix 
(e.g. innovation support) while others are confined to relatively incremen-
tal improvements (e.g. insulation). Thus, in the face of multiple barriers, 
current policy approaches appear insufficient.
Two things are clear from the preceding discussion. First, to reach our climate 
change targets, we must significantly reduce energy demand relative to business- 
as-usual scenarios, and possibly also in absolute terms. Second, the pathways to 
doing so defy simple or straightforward solutions. This brings us to the challenge 
of finding the most effective approach, and to the contribution of a ‘sociotech-
nical’ perspective on energy demand.
Perspectives on reducing energy demand: the sociotechnical 
approach
The challenge of reducing energy demand has been approached from many 
different theoretical perspectives including neoclassical economics (focusing on 
economic barriers to energy efficiency), social psychology (focusing on cogni-
tive, emotional and affective influences on energy- related choices) and social 
practice theory (focusing on how habitual behaviour and social norms shape 
energy demand). Each approach offers valuable insights, but also has blind spots 
and weaknesses – particularly in relation to achieving more radical reductions 
in energy demand. This book therefore proposes a complementary sociotechnical 
perspective that can overcome some of these limitations. The sociotechnical 
approach is well established in the academic literature but has rarely been 
applied to energy demand.
 A distinguishing feature of the sociotechnical approach is the expansion of 
the unit of analysis from individual technologies to the sociotechnical systems 
that provide energy services such as thermal comfort and mobility. Sociotechni-
cal systems are understood as the interdependent mix of social and technical 
entities that function collectively to deliver specific energy services. They 
include physical artefacts (e.g. infrastructures, conversion technologies, passive 
systems), social arrangements (e.g. firms, supply chains, markets, regulations) 
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and intangible elements such as skills, habits, routines, expectations and social 
norms (Geels, 2004). The sociotechnical system associated with electricity, for 
example, includes: physical artefacts such as power stations and transmission 
lines; social arrangements such as electricity markets, technical standards and 
industry associations; and intangible elements such as electrical engineering 
skills and the social practices associated with electricity provision and use 
(Hughes, 1983). Sociotechnical systems develop over many decades and the 
alignment and co- evolution of the different elements leads to mutual depend-
ence and resistance to change (Geels, 2002). Since the configuration of socio-
technical systems shapes the level, nature and pattern of energy demand, 
significant reductions in energy demand requires not just changes in individual 
technologies, but far- reaching changes in the sociotechnical systems themselves. 
We term such changes sociotechnical transitions.
 The sociotechnical perspective has its roots in the study of innovation but 
differs from more conventional approaches to innovation by: first, focusing on 
broader systems and processes of long- term change in those systems; and second, 
understanding innovation as both a technical and social process that necessi-
tates complex relationships between a range of actors (including firms, research-
ers, policymakers and consumers). These actors develop strategies, make 
investments, learn, open up new markets and develop new routines. As an 
example, a sociotechnical account of transitions in the electricity system would 
include the changes within and interrelationships between: public policies and 
industry regulators; the strategies of generation, network and supply companies; 
the practices of electricity consumers; and the cognitive, normative and regula-
tive rules that underpin different elements of the system (Geels, 2002; 
Hammond et al., 2013).
 This book investigates how transitions in sociotechnical systems occur and 
their potential contribution to reducing energy demand. We assume that such 
transitions centre around particular low- energy innovations – defined as technolo-
gies or social practices that differ significantly from existing technologies and 
practices and have the potential to radically improve energy efficiency and/or 
reduce energy demand. An example would be the central role of heat pumps in 
a transition from gas to electric heating systems. We seek to make a distinctive 
contribution to the energy demand literature by developing a sociotechnical 
understanding of the emergence, diffusion and impact of such innovations. We 
aim to uncover the processes and mechanisms through which different types of 
low- energy innovation become (or fail to become) established, identify the role 
of different groups, explore the resulting impacts on energy demand and other 
social goals, and develop practical recommendations for both encouraging the 
diffusion of such innovations and maximising their long- term impact.
 Our approach rests upon two assumptions. First, innovations must be situated 
and studied within broader sociotechnical systems, particularly when their diffu-
sion is associated with fundamental changes in those systems (sociotechnical 
transitions). Second, to have a significant impact on energy demand, such 
innovations should be technologically radical, socially radical, or a combination 
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of the two – what Dahlin and Behrens (2005) term ‘systemically radical’. 
Radical innovations disrupt established sociotechnical systems – in this case the 
dominant energy- and carbon- intensive systems – and lead to far- reaching 
changes in the nature and functioning of those systems (see Chapter 2).
UK policy on energy demand
This book focuses primarily on the UK, one of a small number of countries that 
have made significant progress in reducing energy demand. Between 2001 and 
2017, UK GDP grew by 31 per cent and population grew by 11.7 per cent, but 
primary energy demand fell by 19 per cent. These reductions have partly been 
achieved by the diffusion of low- energy innovations – such as energy- efficient 
lighting, appliances, boilers, electric motors and vehicles – and these in turn 
have been encouraged by policies such as building regulations, appliance stand-
ards and energy efficiency obligations. But demand reductions have also resulted 
from economic restructuring and the ‘offshoring’ of energy- intensive manufac-
turing to other countries. In this regard, reductions in UK energy use and emis-
sions have been offset by increased energy use and emissions elsewhere. While 
such reductions may contribute to UK climate targets, they do little to address 
global climate change. Barrett et al. (2013) estimate, for instance, that while 
the UK’s territorial greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions fell by 27 per cent 
between 1990 and 2008, it’s ‘consumption- based’ emissions increased by ~20 
per cent as a consequence of imported consumer goods displacing (more energy 
efficient) domestic production.
 The UK has set long- term, legally binding targets for reducing GHG emis-
sions and has established an independent Committee on Climate Change 
(CCC) to set intermediate targets and oversee progress. But the CCC (2018) 
warns that the UK is not on course to meet its ‘carbon budgets’ and that urgent 
action is required to both bring forward new policies and to reduce the risk of 
existing policies failing to deliver. Despite the UK’s progress to date, new meas-
ures are urgently required to deliver deeper and faster improvements in energy 
efficiency, particularly in ‘more difficult’ sectors such as domestic heating 
(Shove, 2017; Staffell, 2017).
 The UK has long history of energy efficiency policies and several of these have 
been very successful – including the series of obligations on energy suppliers to 
improve household energy efficiency (Mallaburn and Eyre, 2014) and the EU 
standards on the energy efficiency of domestic appliances. But there have also been 
notable failures, including the flagship Green Deal policy that was intended to 
deliver large- scale energy efficiency retrofits but was terminated only two years after 
its launch (Rosenow and Eyre, 2016). The IEA observes that UK energy efficiency 
policy has neglected security of supply and other concerns (IEA, 2006, 2012b; Kern 
et al., 2017), the CCC criticise the large- scale decline in investment after 2013 and 
the current dearth of policy initiatives, and Hardt et al. (2018) highlight the slow-
down in the rate of efficiency improvement in industry and the limited scope for 
further energy savings through offshoring.
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 Overall then, the UK serves as both an exemplar of successful measures and a 
cautionary tale. While offshoring is clearly unsustainable in terms of reaching 
global emissions goals, the UK provides some good examples of what can be 
done, as well as what should be avoided. Several of these cases are covered in 
this book2 and provide lessons that are relevant to a range of contexts.
About the book
This book is based upon research by the Centre on Innovation and Energy 
Demand (CIED), a five- year, social science research centre funded by the UK 
Research Councils. Focusing primarily on the UK, the book uses a sociotechnical 
approach to explore the challenge of reducing energy demand. The book 
includes theoretical discussions, literature reviews and a series of empirical case 
studies organised around the themes of emergence, diffusion and impact of low- 
energy innovations. The chosen cases include both new technologies (e.g. smart 
meters, vehicle automation and district heating) and new organisational 
arrangements (e.g. integrated policy mixes) that either have or could have signi-
ficant impacts on energy demand. The book has the dual aim of improving the 
academic understanding of sociotechnical transitions and energy demand and 
providing practical recommendations for public policy.
Structure
This booked is structured around the themes of emergence, diffusion and impact 
– introduced in full in Chapter 2. We do not argue that all innovations follow a 
linear progression between these stages (which often overlap), but instead 
present them as a useful framework for conceptualising the innovation journey.
 Emergence: The term emergence does not refer to the initial invention of 
new ideas (e.g. from scientific research), but the introduction of those ideas into 
society. Emerging technologies, behaviours, institutional arrangements and busi-
ness models struggle to become established against more dominant systems and 
can easily fail. Before innovations can break through into broader markets, 
space needs to be created for learning and improvement, for the building of 
social networks and for stabilisation around a dominant configuration or design. 
The chapters on emergence examine these processes for specific low- energy 
innovations and uncover the conditions for their success.
 Diffusion: Innovations spread when their performance improves and costs 
fall as a result of network, scale and learning economies; when public policies 
support their adoption; and when they become aligned with people’s expecta-
tions and behaviours. Diffusion does not happen into an ‘empty’ world, but in 
the context of existing sociotechnical systems that provide barriers and active 
resistance. Many low- energy innovations are not intrinsically attractive to the 
majority of consumers since they are often (initially) more expensive and 
perform less well on key dimensions. The chapters on diffusion explore the 
mechanisms driving this process for selected low- energy innovations, and 
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examine how infrastructures, business models, social norms, values and public 
policies need to change for such innovations to succeed.
 Impact: The diffusion of low- energy innovations will only contribute to 
climate goals if they lead to significant reductions in economy- wide energy con-
sumption. But research on innovation and sociotechnical transitions has paid 
relatively little attention to the ultimate impact of innovations on energy 
demand or other social goals. More generally, the links between economic 
growth, energy efficiency and energy consumption remain poorly understood. 
The chapters on impact therefore employ both orthodox and novel methods for 
estimating the historical impacts of low- energy innovations and for projecting 
their potential future impacts.
Chapters
Across each chapter, Transitions in Energy Efficiency and Demand moves from 
contextually- specific first principles through to empirical research in selected 
areas and, finally, to ideas for how these systems can be most effectively be 
changed. While each chapter is structured differently, they all include specific 
policy recommendations.
 The first section of the book, ‘Analytical perspectives’ provides a conceptual 
and normative orientation to the problem of reducing energy demand. Chapter 
2, provides a theoretical primer on the problems addressed by this book, and the 
potential contribution of the sociotechnical approach. This includes an over-
view of the ‘multi- level perspective’ on sociotechnical transitions and a survey 
of key debates relevant to emerge, diffusion and impact. Chapter 3 adds an 
ethical dimension to this discussion, considering the broader normative prob-
lems of energy provision through a case study of fuel poverty in the UK.
 Chapter 4 begins the section on ‘The emergence and diffusion of innovations’ 
by considering visions of personal transport futures in the UK and the role of elec-
tric vehicles therein. It argues that policymakers would benefit from engaging with 
a variety of future visions, including the possibility of disruption and shocks and 
the failure to meet emission reduction targets. Chapter 5 then examines the exper-
imentation with automated vehicles that is underway in several UK cities. It 
points to the highly managed processes of these experiments (e.g. where and when 
experiments occur, who is included/excluded, what counts as an experiment), 
which limit the opportunity for second- order learning and surprises. Chapter 6 
explores the evolution of the UK smart meter rollout, including the obstacles 
faced and the potential implications for energy justice and consumer vulnerability. 
Lastly, Chapter 7 investigates the mammoth task of comprehensively upgrading 
UK residential buildings, highlighting the need for consistent and ambitious policy 
targets; the importance of new business models and finance mechanisms; and the 
role of intermediary actors in supporting policy implementation.
 Moving on to the ‘Societal impacts and co- benefits’ section, Chapter 8 explores 
the importance of energy for economic growth and summarise a number of recent 
studies which suggest that efficiency improvements are key driver of growth and 
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that the rebound effects from those improvements can be large. Chapter 9 is more 
forward- looking, using macroeconomic modelling to explore the economy- wide 
impacts of UK household energy efficiency improvements. They show how these 
can stimulate economic activity, leading to increased employment, investment 
and savings, and argue that a focus on rebound effects can obscure the wider eco-
nomic and social benefits of improved energy efficiency.
 The section on ‘Policy mixes and implications’ considers the policy frameworks 
for facilitating low- energy innovation. Chapter 10 uses a series of historical cases 
studies to investigate how policymakers can deliberately accelerate sociotechnical 
transitions – highlighting the importance of ‘disarming’ resistance from incumbent 
actors, popular support for the transition and the level of maturity of the core 
innovation. Chapter 11 goes on to discuss the challenge of delivering energy effi-
ciency policy in the UK, arguing that political sensitivities about energy prices, 
neglect of the social benefits of energy efficiency and rigid adherence to neoclassi-
cal economic theory have hampered effective policy. This feeds directly into 
Chapter 12 on policy mixes for energy demand reduction. This chapter draws on 
the emerging policy mixes for energy transitions literature and highlights the com-
parative neglect of energy efficiency policy mixes. It goes on to summarise the 
empirical findings conducted as part of CIED with a view to both: (1) drawing out 
overall insights and avenues for future research and (2) establishing policy reflec-
tions on design principles for policy mixes in which energy efficiency plays a key 
role. Closing this section, Chapter 13 reviews the literature on Strategic Niche 
Management (SNM), identifying some lessons for both researchers and policy-
makers working towards low- energy transitions.
 The conclusion (Chapter 14) summarises and elaborates the contributions of 
each chapter and develops a summative list of conceptual and policy principles 
for accelerating energy demand reduction. Taken together the chapters provide 
a comprehensive, sociotechnical account of the energy demand challenge and 
provide both new empirical results and practical suggestions for achieving 
meaningful change. We hope you enjoy!
Notes
1 This is a higher rate of reduction than assumed in many scenarios, since it excludes 
the possibility of temporarily overshooting the 2°C target and compensating subse-
quently through the use of negative emission technologies.
2 Although we also reference Denmark, Japan, Finland, New Zealand and the Nether-
lands, for example.
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